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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we tried to examine whether the implementation of inflation targeting (IT) monetary 
policy and its discipline character allows reducing the budget deficit in emerging countries. To do 
this, we used the propensity score matching methodology to evaluate the treatment effect of IT on 
fiscal discipline, in terms of budget deficit performance, in emerging countries has adopted this 
monetary policy framework. Our empirical analysis, conducted on a sample of 41 economies (20 
IT and 21 non-IT economies) for the period from 1990 to 2010, shows that on average IT adoption 
has had a considerable and significant effect in reducing the budget deficit. Our results are 
confirmed by the robustness tests and corroborate the literature of disciplining effects of IT 
regime on the fiscal discipline. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ver the last twenty years, some developed, emerging, and developing countries have chosen to follow in 
the footsteps of New Zealand by adopting the inflation targeting (thereafter IT) regime as an anchor for 
the conduct of monetary policy. Indeed, valuable theoretical studies (see, e.g., Bernanke & Mishkin, 
1997; Svensson, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999) were motivated by the common finding in many empirical studies 
(see, e.g., Goncalves & Salles, 2008; Lin & Ye, 2009), for, the IT policy has helped emerging inflation targeters to 
have a significant improvement in macroeconomic performance which is mainly measured through the behavior of 
inflation, output, and interest rates. But the success of these countries in the conduct of their forward IT policy must 
be accompanied by a pro-active management of institutional dimensions namely the independence and transparency 
of the central bank as well as those structural and techniques.
1
 
 
Otherwise an extensive literature has focused in recent decades on further analyzing the interactions that 
may exist between monetary and fiscal policies, in particular the link between debt/public deficit and inflation 
phenomenon. Indeed, in a famous article, Sargent and Wallace (1981) show that a too lax fiscal policy may require 
monetary policy to deviate from its goal of price stability and to monetize the debt (seigniorage revenue). A result 
recently confirmed by Leeper and Walker (2011), Davig et al. (2011), and Villieu (2011). Even more interesting, 
Amato and Gerlach (2002), Fischer et al. (2002), Vu (2004), Catao and Terrones (2005), and Wimanda, Turner, and 
Hall (2011) argue that the high rate of inflation, observed especially in many developing countries, is associated 
with important deficits, mainly financed by seigniorage revenue. Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Obstfeld (1991), 
Jensen (1994), Van der Ploeg (1995), Van Arle et al. (1995), and Minea et al. (2011) agree on the fact that if the 
central bank decides to grant significant weight in its loss function to the price stability objective, it will reduce 
seigniorage revenue and compel the State to increase tax revenues through tax mobilization effort. Given that the IT 
policy requires a process of economic and institutional reforms, to satisfy the pre-conditions for its implementation 
                                                          
1 Roger and Stone (2005), Batini and Laxton (2006), and others were more interested in the study of these factors in the successful application of 
the IT rule. 
O 
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indicated above, and that in order to achieve the expected macroeconomic performance, this could have a relatively 
large disciplining effect on the conduct of fiscal policy in avoiding seigniorage revenue and therefore opting for a 
tax mobilization and public deficit reduction. However, developed inflation targeters have become more fiscally 
disciplined in order to reach the target and in the framework of the economic policies coordination. 
 
On the empirical front, works like Miles (2007), Tapsoba (2010), and Abo-Zaid and Tüzemen (2011) have 
sought to test whether the IT policy, as a monetary policy framework aimed at stabilizing the inflation especially in 
emerging countries, could act positively on fiscal discipline. Using a setup similar to that of Huang and Wei (2006) 
but reversing the timing of the game, Minea and Villieu (2008) and Minea, Tapsoba, and Villieu (2012) show that 
IT does produce an incentive for governments to improve institutional quality and this monetary strategy should 
encourage the government to reinforce its tax collection system and rationalize its public expenditures. Recently, 
Lucotte (2012) conducted an empirical analysis of 59 countries (40 non-inflation targeters and 19 are targeters) 
covering the 1980-2009 period and that using the method of propensity score matching. He concluded that on 
average, the adoption of IT, which involves strengthening the independence of the central bank and maintaining a 
low level of inflation, had a large and significant effect on the effort of tax revenue mobilization or collection. Based 
on this theoretical and empirical literature review that puts in evidence the disciplining effect of the IT on tax policy, 
we can say that the emerging government can realize ex-post (or not?) a decline in their public deficits. 
 
Hence, our contribution to the previous literature is then to evaluate the effect of the IT’s adoption by 
emerging countries on their budgetary discipline in terms of reducing or mastering the budget deficit, using an 
approach borrowed from the micro econometrics of evaluation which will be explained later. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. The second section presents the data used and a few stylized facts. The 
methodology is described in Section 3. Section 4 discusses our econometric results and reports the robustness 
checks. Section 5 concludes, highlighting the main policy implications of our empirical findings. 
 
2. DATA AND STYLIZED FACTS 
 
We start from a set of annual data, a heterogeneous sample of 41 emerging countries, 20 are inflation 
targeters (treatment group) and 21 non-inflation targeters (control group), covering the 1990-2010 period. We retain 
here all emerging countries that have pursued an IT regime in the treatment group. In fact, we are based on the 
sample used in Lin and Ye (2009) and we added at targeters Guatemala, Romania, Slovakia, and Turkey that have 
adopted IT between 2005 and 2006 and they were considered as non-IT countries (the control group) for these 
authors. Noting that Serbia and Ghana have implemented the IT between 2006 and 2007 and are not included in the 
list of inflation targeters in Lin and Ye (2009). In addition, our control group was selected relying on the criteria 
defined by Lin and Ye (2009), based on the level of economic development and the size of the country.
2
 Table 1 
shows the sample of countries selected for this study, as well as the respective adoption(s’) dates for the inflation 
targeters. 
 
To examine of a preliminary manner whether the adoption of the IT policy has reduced the public deficit in 
the emerging targeters, we identified two key variables namely: the inflation rate calculated on the basis of the CPI 
and the budget deficit (% of GDP) as the state revenue (including grants) minus expense, minus net acquisition of 
non-financial assets. The data of these two variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
of the World Bank (WB). The other(s) variables so called "conditional" will be presented in the third subsection, 
(but) after the explanation of the methodology of the work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Given these two criteria, the authors do not include in the control group that countries with a GDP/capita at least as high as the poorest targeting 
country and having a population at least as important as the least populated targeting country. 
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Table 1: List of the Sample Countries with Dates of Inflation Targeting Adoption 
IT countries Full-Fledged Adoption Non-IT Countries 
Brazil 1999 Algeria 
Chile 2000 Angola 
Colombia 2000 Argentina 
Czech Republic 1998 Bulgaria 
Ghana 2007 China 
Guatemala 2005 Côte d'Ivoire 
Hungary 2001 
Dominican Republic 
Egypt 
Indonesia 2005 El Salvador 
Israel 1997 Ecuador 
Mexico 2001 India 
Peru 2002 Malaysia 
Philippines 2002 Morocco 
Poland 1999 Nigeria 
Romania 2005 Pakistan 
Serbia 2006 Russia 
Slovakia 2005 Senegal 
South Africa  2000 Singapore 
South Korea  1998 Tunisia 
Thailand 2000 Uruguay 
Turkey 2006 Venezuela 
Source: Lin and Ye (2009) and Internet sites of central banks. Note that Slovakia abandoned the IT in 2009 and joined the euro area. 
 
Figures 1 (a) and (b) provide respectively a comparison of average inflation well as the average budget 
deficit (% of GDP) in emerging inflation targeters before and after the adoption of IT. Also, Figures 2 (a) and (b) 
correspond to the average inflation and the average budget deficit (% of GDP) in non IT emerging countries but 
before and after 2000, date taken as a period of demarcation and more specifically, it is about the average dates of IT 
adoption in emerging economies (based on Coulibaly & Kempf, 2010). These figures are emerge two preliminary 
results. Firstly, we note that on average the level of inflation has reduced both in emerging countries after adoption 
of the IT policy and those non-inflation targeters after 2000, knowing that the average of the inflation was too high 
at the level of inflation targeters before the adoption of IT compared to non-inflation targeters before 2000. Result 
has been confirmed by several authors and more precisely by Brito and Bystedt (2010). Secondly and more 
interesting, the average budget deficit (% of GDP) was reduced at the emerging inflation targeters after application 
of IT, contrary to the non-IT emerging economies where there has been an increase of the deficit after 2000. This 
result gives us an idea that emerging inflation targeters become more disciplined after the implementation of the IT 
strategy, which has been intensifying their efforts to collect tax revenue and/or expenditure rationalization, allowing 
reduces to their budget deficits.  
 
 
Figure 1(a) Figure 1(b) 
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Figure 2(a) Figure 2(b) 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section and in particular, we will try to define the econometric methodology to be used in order to 
empirically test the impact of the implementation of the IT policy on the performance of fiscal policy in emerging 
states, in terms of mastery or even budget deficit reduction. More specifically, our objective is to evaluate the 
treatment effect of IT on the budget deficit in emerging countries that have adopted this monetary policy framework. 
 
3.1 The Treatment Effect 
 
We consider Equation (1) below to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT): 
 
ATT = E[(Yi1- Yio)|ITi = 1] = E[Yi1|ITi = 1] – E[Yio|ITi = 1] (1) 
 
where: ITi is the adoption variable of IT which is a dummy variable of treatment; Yi1 is the value of the outcome 
variable for inflation targeter i, that corresponds within the framework of our study to the budget deficit, and Y i0 if 
not; Y
i0 
| IT
i = 1 is the value of the result that would have been observed if a targeter has not adopted IT regime and Yi1 
| IT
i 
= 1 is the value of the result really observed in the same inflation targeter. The estimate of (ATT) poses a 
problem with the term E [Yi0 | ITi = 1], of Equation (1), which is not observable; that is to say, in our case, we 
cannot observe the performance in terms of the budget deficit of an emerging inflation targeter if it did not apply this 
policy. Therefore, in order to counteract this problem, a common approach consists in estimating (ATT) by 
comparing the sample mean of the treatment group (ITers) with that of the control group (non-ITers). The 
estimators obtained are not biased if the targeting decision is random (the treatment is random). However, “this 
method would generate biased estimates if the targeting decision is not random. In particular, if the targeting choice 
is systematically correlated with a set of observable variables that also affect the outcomes, then we will have the 
selection on observables problems,
3
 which makes traditional linear regression an unreliable method” (Lin & Ye, 
2007). So, to solve this problem of selection on observables, we use
4
 a variety of propensity score matching 
methods developed recently in the literature of the treatment effects. 
 
3.2 The Propensity Score Matching Method (PSM)
5
 
 
The principle of the PSM method consists of matching a treated observation with an untreated observation 
whose observable characteristics are comparable (and) considering the result Yi0 of the latter as the counterfactual 
                                                          
3 For more details of discussions on “The so-called self-selection problem,” see Heckman et al. (1998), Dehejia and Wahba (2002), and Caliendo 
and Kopeinig (2008). 
4 As in the works of Vega and Winkelried (2005), Lin and Ye (2007, 2009), Walsh (2009), De Mendonca and Guimaraes e Souza (2011), etc. 
Note that this approach is widely used in micro-econometrics well as in different areas such as health, education, etc. 
5 Initiated by Rubin (1977) and recently developed by Heckman et al. (1998). 
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of the treated observation. In other words, it accomplishes the matching of the ITers with the non-ITers that have the 
same observed characteristics, so that the difference between the result of a targeter and the matching counterfactual 
can be attributed to the treatment (the adoption of IT). In addition, the empirical validity of the PSM is based on two 
fundamental assumptions. The first is the conditional independence assumption which implies that conditional on a 
set of observable characteristics Xit, the results variables Y0 and Y1 are independent from the treatment variable ITit. 
This assumption is expressed as follows:
6
 
 
(Y
0 ,Y1 ┴ ITit|Xit ) (2) 
 
We may thus write Equation (1) as follows: 
 
ATT = E(Yi1|ITi = 1, Xi) – E(Yi0|ITi = 0, Xi) (3) 
 
However, as shown by the theorem of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), compliance with the conditional 
independence assumption is essential because it allows to match the treated and untreated observations on the basis 
of their propensity score P(Xit), and not on all the conditioning variables as was the case with the matching method 
previously developed by Rubin (1977), in order to overcome the difficulty of matching Xit in the practical case, that 
the number of covariates in these variables tends to increase. This therefore means that: 
 
(Y
0 ,Y1 ┴ ITit |P ( Xit) ) or else  (Y0 ┴ ITit |P ( Xit) ) (4) 
 
Thus, the propensity score, which in our study means the probability for an emerging country i to adopt in 
year t an IT policy conditionally to the observable covariates Xit, and it can be noted: 
 
P(Xi) = E[ITi |Xi] = Pr(ITi = 1|Xi) (5) 
 
The second hypothesis is the common support condition of propensity scores, whose importance for the 
application of PSM was emphasized by Heckman et al. (1998). This condition ensures the existence of some control 
countries comparable to each of the treated countries. Formally, the condition of common support can be written as: 
 
0 < p( X it ) < 1 (6) 
 
Therefore, the ATT can be estimated as follows: 
 
ATT = E[Yi1|ITi = 1, P(Xi)] – E[Yi0|ITi = 0, P(Xi)] (7) 
 
Moreover, the process of estimating the average treatment effect on the treated includes four steps referring 
in particular to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Khander et al. (2010). Indeed, the first step consists in estimating 
the propensity scores
7
 relying on the conditioning variables Xit retained (and) which will be described in the next 
section. Once the estimated propensity scores, we proceed to the determination of the area of the common support 
densities of the two groups of countries propensity scores (targeters and non-inflation targeters) inside which will be 
calculated the ATT,( and) relying on the "Min-Max" technique developed by Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and 
detailed by Smith and Todd (2005). The third step is to estimate the ATT, specifically the average effect of the IT’s 
adoption on the budget deficit (as a percentage of GDP) of economies that have adopted this monetary policy 
framework. To do this, we have chosen to retain three among four propensity score matching methods which there 
are four types.
8
 
 
 
                                                          
6 This assumption can be relaxed as follows: (Y
0 ┴
 ITit|P ( Xit) ), since we want to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated and not on 
the entire sample and therefore it is sufficient that the random variables Y0 and ITit are independent. 
7 According to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), the use of probit/logit models, where the treatment variable is a dichotomous variable, provide 
almost the same results. 
8 Nearest-Neighbor Matching, Radius Matching, Local Linear Regression Matching and Kernel Matching. 
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(i) First, it refers to the estimator of N nearest neighbor (Nearest-neighbor matching) paired with replacement 
and consists of matching each treated or treatment observation with N control units (or the N non-treated 
observations) having the scores of the nearest propensity (We consider N = 1, N = 2, and N = 3). 
(ii) The second method is the Local linear regression matching (LLRM) developed by Heckman et al. (1998). 
(iii) Finally, we use the method of Kernel matching (Tricube9) which consists to be retained all untreated units 
(non_ITers) (of retaining all the untreated units) belonging to the common support for the construction of 
the counterfactual; i.e., where each observation being weighted untreated so decreasing in function of its 
distance to the considered treated observation. In other words, this method proposed by Heckman et al. 
(1998) allows matching a treatment unit (an ITer) to all control units (non-ITers) proportionally weighted in 
function to their proximity (in terms of propensity scores) to the treated unit. 
 
The last step is to calculate the standard deviation which allows the assessment of the statistical 
significance of the ATT using the bootstrap technique proposed by Lechner (2002) and detailed by Brownstone and 
Valletta (2001); noting that the retained number of replications is 500. 
 
3.3 Treatment, Result and Conditioning Variables 
 
3.3.1 Treatment versus Outcome Variables 
 
In our study, the treatment variable as it was already described above is the IT (ITit). It is considered as a 
dummy variable, taking the value 1 if a country led an IT strategy during the considered year, and 0 if not. In 
addition, we have chosen to study the treatment variable (IT_FF) for "accomplished" adoption (fully-fledged 
adoption), counter to the works of Levya (2008) and others who have considered two dates corresponding to a 
"partial" adoption and another "accomplished.” These two dates may differ if a country does not meet all the criteria 
or prerequisites characterizing an IT policy. Concerning the outcome variable, we have retained the budget deficit 
(B_DEFICIT) as % of GDP presented in the previous section. 
 
3.3.2 The Conditioning Variables 
 
Finally, the departure conditioning variables applied in our study to estimate the propensity scores and 
expected to affect both the outcome indicator and the treatment variable are eight in number, thus satisfying the 
conditional independence hypothesis developed in the methodology section. In fact, four of these variables refer to 
the institutional and economic preconditions theoretically required for the adoption of IT (see, e.g., Batini & Laxton, 
2006). These variables are the lagged inflation rate of one period (INF_1) taken from the WB’s WDI database, the 
rotation rate of Governors at the head of the central bank calculated by sub-periods of five years (TOR_5) as a 
reverse proxy of the monetary authority independence and come from Dreher et al. (2008) and Lucotte (2012), the 
degree of de facto flexibility of the exchange rate (EXCH) comprised between 1 and 14 from the least to more 
flexible exchange rate regime and extracted from IMF’s AREAR & Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and, the domestic 
credit for the private sector to GDP ratio (CRED) measuring the level of financial development and taken from the 
WB’s WDI database. We expect, on the basis of the literature results, a negative correlation between the probability 
of IT adoption and inflation, the rate of rotation variables, while the two other variables are supposed to act 
positively on this probability. In addition, following Lin and Ye (2007, 2009), we consider the degree of trade 
openness (OPEN) as a conditioning variable that reflects the "fear of floating,"
10
 and which is obtained from the 
WB’s WDI database and measured by the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP. We can therefore 
theoretically expect a negative effect for this variable on the probability of IT adoption. The sixth conditioning 
variable, according to Truman (2003) and obtained from WDI, is the rate of real GDP per capita growth 
(GDPpc_G). We expect a negative effect for this variable on the probability of the IT adoption (Truman, 2003; 
Samaryna & De Haan, 2011), knowing that a high rate of real GDP per capita growth can be considered as the result 
of the macro-economic policies success, which does not necessarily imply an alternative framework of IT. The two 
other conditioning variables that theoretically affect both IT_FF and B_DEFICIT variables and whose objective is to 
satisfy the conditional independence assumption, are the total public debt as a percentage of GDP (PUB_DEBT) 
                                                          
9 There are others types of functions aside from tricube namely Gaussian, Epanechnikov, biweight, uniform. 
10 See Calvo and Reinhart (2002). 
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taken from the new dataset computed by Abbas et al. (2010), and the democracy indicator (POLITY2), taking values 
from -10 (very autocratic) to +10 (very democratic), developed by Polity IV Project. We expect that the public debt 
has a negative effect on the probability of IT adoption while the democracy indicator impacts positively this 
probability. Finally, we present below (Table 2) the descriptive statistics of these conditioning variables over the 
period of our study. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  (1990-2010) 
GDPpc_G 820 2.366194 4.816255 -37.08575 17.76985 
INF_1 782 56.17121 370.8253 -1.753557 7481.664 
TOR_5 800 .22375 .2091426 0 1 
EXCH 535 8.770093 3.897738 1 15 
CRED 791 39.72655 30.9886 0 165.7191 
OPEN 799 73.38848 49.47239 13.75305 438.0917 
PUB_DEBT 762 55.0335 32.97057 1.026661 289.5542 
POLITY2 837 4.574671 5.479909 -8 10 
Source: Authors' calculations 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Estimation of Propensity Scores 
 
We estimate the propensity scores using a probit model
11
 and the results of the probit estimates are 
presented in Table 3 where the considered endogenous variable is the accomplished adoption (IT_FF). We note that 
apart from the turnover rate of central bank governors and the domestic credit, the estimated coefficients associated 
with the other retained conditioning variables such as INF_1, EXCH, OPEN, PUB_DEBT, and POLITY2 are 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% and have the expected sign, except for the real GDP per capita growth. 
This result is nonetheless consistent with those found by Lin and Ye (2009). In addition, the explanatory power of 
the model is high, with a pseudo-R
2
 of McFadden equal to 71.7%. 
 
Table 3: Probit Estimates of Propensity Scores 
 
IT_FF 
(1) 
GDPpc_G 0.176** 
 
(0.071) 
INF_1 -0.247*** 
 
(0.058) 
TOR_5 -0.676 
 
(1.372) 
EXCH 0.588*** 
 
(0.133) 
CRED 0.002 
 
(0.012) 
OPEN -0.015** 
 
(0.006) 
PUB_DEBT -0.012* 
 
(0.007) 
POLITY2 0.698* 
  (0.270) 
Number of observations 222 
Pseudo-R2 0.717 
Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations. ***, **, 
* represent respectively the statistical significance at 
threshold of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
                                                          
11 Logit model does not change the results significantly. 
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4.2 The Results of Matching 
 
Before leaning on the results of our estimates for different matching methods which are shown in Table 4, 
we first of all interested in the analysis of (we need to analyze) the common support area. Indeed, it is clear that the 
procedure of determining the common support area has led to the elimination of 14 treated observations among the 
37 initial ones, that is about 38% of the total sample of treaties group. Concerning the estimation results, they are 
generally satisfactory and considerable enough to observe a significant impact of the IT adoption on reducing the 
budget deficits of economies have implemented this monetary policy framework. On average, this impact, in terms 
of absolute value, east of the order of 1.71 percentage points of GDP. Given this average value, the contribution of 
IT to the budget deficit reduction can be rather important, as it enhances the budget balance in emerging countries 
by at least 1.565 (LLRM) and up to 1.886 (Kernel matching) percentage points of GDP. So our estimation results 
largely corroborate the theoretical arguments mentioned above. 
 
Table 4: Matching Estimates of Treatment Effect on the Budget Deficit (In % of GDP) 
 
Algorithms of Matching 
Nearest-Neighbor Matching LLRM Kernal Matching 
N =1 N = 2 N = 3 (Tricube) (Tricube) 
IT_FF 
(1) Average Treatment on Treated 
(ATT) 
-1.878** -1.647** -1.623** -1.565*** -1.886* 
(0.883) (0.805) (0.814) (0.585) (1.003) 
Nb of treated units on common support 23 23 23 23 23 
Nb of treated unit off common support 14 14 14 14 14 
Nb of untreated observations 185 185 185 185 185 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors on the basis of 500 replications are in parentheses. ***, **, * represent respectively the statistical significance 
at threshold of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
 
In this section, we try to test the sensitivity of our results through a variety of robustness tests and therefore 
a set of alternative specifications. Firstly and following Kluve et al. (2002), Smith and Todd (2005), and Lucotte 
(2012), we test the robustness of our results by varying the specification of our initial probit model, and through the 
separate inclusion of additional conditioning variables satisfying as well the conditional independence assumption; 
i.e., we introduce some variables that could simultaneously influence the choice of adopting IT and the level of 
fiscal balance. These variables are the amount of public consumption expenditure on GDP (GVT_EXP) obtained 
from the WB’s WDI database and the total public revenue variable excluding grants as % of GDP noted (TAX_REV) 
compiled by the CERDI. Based on the paper of Fang, Miller, and Lee (2010), we have made the choice to integrate 
these two main components of fiscal balance in order to lift the risk of an endogeneity problem which can bias the 
results of the PSM. In fact, these authors, using the PSM method, show that a sound fiscal balance increases the 
probability of adopting the IT regime by developing countries, and the fact of integrating into the probit model both 
main variables made solve this problem. Also, we move from a de facto measure of the central bank independence 
to a de jure measure. We therefore replace in the probit model the turnover rate of central bank governors (TOR_5) 
by the indicator of de jure central bank independence (CWN_IND) developed by Cukierman et al. (1992) & Crowe 
and Meade (2007) which is comprised between 0 and 1, and the fourth component of the CWN indicator that 
measures the independence of the central bank in terms of financial relations vis-à-vis the public treasury 
(CBI_LEN). As shown in the introduction, the inclusion of this variable seems particularly important in the 
framework of our study. In the second place, we test the sensitivity of our results to the composition of the treatment 
group. Therefore, we exclude New ITers of this group. More precisely, we are talking about countries that have 
adopted IT since 2005 (Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Turkey), so we consider a 
similar group that refers to the study of Lin and Ye (2009). 
 
The results of the robustness checks of probit estimates reported in Table 5 shows that CBI_LEN (column 
3), CWN_IND (column 4), and TAX_REV (column 5) are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respective 
threshold, except GVT_EXP variable (column 2). In addition, the three significant variables above mentioned have 
the expected sign; i.e., a positive impact on the probability of adopting IT. Noting that there has been no large 
significant change of probit estimation results compared to the starting situation (Table 3, column 1), but we can 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – July/August 2014 Volume 30, Number 4 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1085 The Clute Institute 
confirm, by introducing the jure measure of the central bank independence such as (CWN_IND) and (CBI_LEN) 
variables, the fact that the central bank independence is an essential prerequisite for IT adoption. Thus, the (CRED) 
variable remains insignificant even after the made robustness tests. If we place ourselves at the level of the second 
set of robustness tests, we should focus on column 6 of Table 5 which reports the results of the probit estimations 
after excluding new ITers of our treatment group. These results are almost similar to the initial probit estimations 
with respect to the expected signs as well as to the significance strengthening of the variable coefficients and the 
clear improvement in the quality of the model fitting. But the variable (OPEN) becomes insignificant in this case. 
 
Moreover, the many alternative specifications of the probit model have not generally affected the estimated 
ATT on the level of fiscal balance. But, relatively, results indicate that the average estimated ATT
12
 is larger when 
we consider a de jure measure of the central bank independence instead of the turnover rate of the central bank 
governors. Similarly, we find that the inclusion of the government expenditure and the tax revenue in the 
specification of the probit model has yielded a good average estimated ATT. Also, by excluding the New ITers 
(Table 6, line 6), this impact, on average and in terms of absolute value, becomes equal to 2.66 percentage points, an 
improvement of the budget deficits as % of GDP of 55.5%. 
 
We thus find the significant impact, with almost the same magnitude, of the IT adoption on the reduction of 
the budget deficit in emerging countries which have adopted this monetary policy framework. This corroborates the 
theoretical and empirical literature review that puts in evidence the disciplining effect of the IT on the tax policy. 
 
Finally, we can say that the conducted robustness tests confirm the interaction between the monetary 
policy, in terms of IT, and the fiscal policy previously explained in the literature review. 
 
Table 5: Probit Estimates of Propensity Scores, Robustness Checks 
 
(2) (3) (4) (5) Excluding New ITers (6) 
GDPpc_G 0.170** 0.124 0.164 0.192*** 0.292*** 
 
(0.071) (0.125) (0.108) (0.074) (0.104) 
INF_1 -0.232*** -0.261*** -0.237*** -0.297*** -0.382*** 
 
(0.058) (0.073) (0.070) (0.073) (0.099) 
TOR_5 -0.221   -0.993 0.830 
 
(1.502) 
  
(1.450) (1.984) 
EXCH 0.490*** 0.807*** 0.675*** 0.581*** 0.911*** 
 
(0.145) (0.173) (0.152) (0.147) (0.240) 
CRED -0.007 0.014 0.020 -0.005 -0.009 
 
(0.015) (0.028) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) 
OPEN -0.011* -0.021** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.010 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
PUB_DEBT -0.01 -0.012 -0.006 -0.015** -0.017** 
 
(0.007) (0.017) (0.015) (0.007) (0.008) 
POLITY2 0.559* 1.044*** 0.927*** 0.536* 0.885*** 
 
(0.325) (0.353) (0.339) (0.286) (0.320) 
GVT_EXP 0.07 
    
 
(0.052) 
    
CBI_LEN 
 
2.865*** 
   
  
(0.985) 
   
CWN_IND 
  
3.966** 
  
   
(1.582) 
  
TAX_REV 
   
0.063* 
 
  
   
(0.033) 
 
Number of observations 221 191 191 221 189 
Pseudo-R2 0.725 0.821 0.791 0.731 0.795 
Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations. ***, **, * represent respectively the statistical significance at threshold of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 For Nearest-neighbor matching (N=1) and LLRM (Tricube). 
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Table 6: Matching Estimates of Treatment Effect on the Budget Deficit (In % of GDP), Robustness Checks 
    Algorithms of Matching 
  
Nearest-Neighbor Matching 
  
LLRM Kernel Matching 
  
N = 1 N = 2 N = 3 (Tricube) (Tricube) 
    
IT_FF 
  
ATT 
     
(2) Adding GVT_Exp -1.345 -1.56** -1.649** -1.247** -1.310 
 
 
(0.863) (0.681) (0.773) (0.518) (1.295) 
(3) Adding CBI_LEN -1.882*** -0.769 -0.364 -1.880*** -1.107 
 
 
(0.527) (0.823) (0.888) (0.679) (0.939) 
(4) Adding CWN index -1.497* -0.740 -0.646 -1.577* -1.049 
 
 
(0.867) (0.682) (0.946) (0.835) (0.989) 
(5) Adding TAX_REV  -1.266 -1.342 -1.473 -1.401** -1.384 
 
 
(0.818) (0.864) (1.001) (0.660) (1.187) 
(6) Excluding New ITers -2.691** -2.345** -2.659** -2.641*** -2.983** 
    (1.357) (1.085) (1.090) (0.957) (1.522) 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors on the basis of 500 replications are in parentheses. ***, **, * represent respectively the statistical significance 
at threshold of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this paper, we tried to study the interaction that may exist between the implementation of IT and the 
conduct of fiscal policy, in terms of the public deficit performance, in the case of emerging economies. Taking 
inspiration from previous works having studied the disciplining effect of the IT on tax policy and using the 
propensity score matching approach, we could evaluate the treatment effect (the adoption of IT) on the budget 
deficit of ITers. Our estimation results consolidated by the robustness tests show a significant impact of IT on the 
reduction of budget deficit in emerging countries having adopted this monetary policy framework. This impact is on 
average in the order of 2.66 percentage points. Therefore, we can say that the emerging government can benefit ex-
post of a decline in their public deficits and our conclusions corroborate the literature disciplining effect of IT on 
fiscal policy. 
 
The policy implications can manifest at two points. On one hand, the adoption of IT renders monetary 
authorities more independent vis-à-vis the public authorities and does produce an incentive for governments to 
improve institutional quality, prompting these to reform their tax systems and therefore to perform their budget 
deficits. On the other hand, it is true that having a sound fiscal policy is a precondition for the adoption of IT, but 
our results confirm that a country that adopt the IT policy can benefit ex-post from more fiscal discipline. This 
feedback effect will therefore allow emerging governments to effectively manage their public finances and thus 
reduce their budget deficits, especially structural, to tolerable levels. 
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